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Abstract
We examine whether the asymmetrical price response to bad and good earnings shocks changes as
the relative level of the market changes.  The study is based on a sample of 24,108 announcements
of firms’ annual earnings during the period 1988 to 1998.  The level of the market is a relative
measure based on the difference between the market P/E at the end of the announcement month and
the average market P/E over the prior 12 months.  Predictions based on behavioral finance models
and extended regime-shifting models suggest that stock prices should respond more strongly to
negative news as the relative market level rises.  Similarly, prices should respond more strongly to
good news in bad times, although the effect should be somewhat attenuated if the regime-shifting
models are descriptively valid.  The findings generally support these predictions.
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1.  Introduction
One of the longest running empirical debates in finance regards the relative pricing of
“value” and “glamour” stocks.  Beginning with early work by Basu (1983) and Stattman (1980),
evidence has accumulated that excess returns on value stocks, that is the issues of companies for
which the ratio of earnings, cash flow or book value per share is large relative to stock price, are
greater than returns on glamour stocks for which these ratios are small.  On one side, Fama and
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) have argued that the observed differential between the returns on
value and glamour stocks represents a risk premium. The alternative view, articulated by
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (LSV, 1994), is that the market fails to price efficiently value and
glamour stocks.
Extending LSV, recent work in behavioral finance such as Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny
(BSV, 1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) argues that the value/glamour
effect is the result of investor psychology.  In particular, the model in BSV allows for investor
underreaction (in the intermediate term) to single shocks, and investor overreaction (in the longer
term) to a series of shocks.  This model also implies an asymmetry in the returns to value and
glamour stocks following a news shock.  Following a string of positive shocks observed in, say,
glamour stocks, the investor in this model expects another positive shock—that is, he expects the
earnings to trend.  If good news is announced, the market response is relatively small since the
positive shock was anticipated.  A negative shock, on the other hand, generates a large negative
return since it is more of a surprise.
The primary empirical tests of the competing explanations for the value/glamour differential
have been conducted on earnings announcements (LaPorta, 1996; Dechow Sloan, 1997).  LaPorta,
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1997) and Bernard, Thomas, and Wahlen (1997) find that
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earnings announcement returns explain almost half of the return differential between value and
glamour stock.  More recently, Skinner and Sloan (1998) use a sample of earnings announcements
and find that when pre-announcement effects are included, the differential reaction to earnings
announcements completely explains the differential returns to value and glamour stocks.  In
addition, Skinner and Sloan also find evidence consistent with the BSV hypothesis.  In particular,
they find that the response to news is asymmetric for value and glamour stocks; the market reacts
more strongly to bad news for both types of firms, but the reaction to bad news for glamour stocks
over the subsequent 20 quarters is much larger.
In the BSV model, the source of uncertainty is the model of earnings for a particular firm,
and hence is firm-specific.  Thus this model can be used to explain a cross-sectional puzzle: why do
value stocks (or, more generally, stocks which have underperformed in the past) appear to
outperform glamour stocks (or stocks which have outperformed in the past) over time.  More
recently, however, there is some anecdotal evidence that market-wide “glamour” effects also are
possible.  For example, in the October 12, 1996 Wall Street Journal, Deborah Lohse speculated that
the asymmetrical response of stock prices to good and bad news is related to the level of the
market:1
Analysts say that stocks that surprise analysts with better-than-expected earnings are
often rewarded with a ho-hum increase if any.  However, the market is punishing
stocks even more than usual for earnings disappointments…. Part of the problem is
fear of the valuation levels that many stocks have reached.  With the market at these
levels, if stocks are slightly down, (in terms of unexpected earnings) they get severely
punished. [emphasis added]
                                                          
1 “Amid a Rally, Underachievers Get Pummeled,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1996.
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The Wall Street Journal quote implies that the behavioral models can be extended from the firm-
specific level to an aggregate level.  Specifically, there are systematic shifts in investor sentiment
that are common across stocks.  That is, during good times, investors extrapolate good news for
companies generally.  However, firms providing specific information that the extrapolation of good
news is not applicable to them are severely punished.  During bad times, the reverse reaction
occurs.
The notion that the market responds more strongly to bad news in good times does not
necessarily require the assumption of irrationality or over-reaction on the part of investors that
underlies much of the value/glamour literature.  For example, regime-switching models, such as
those developed by David (1997) and Veronesi (1999), offer a rational explanation for the market
responding more strongly to bad news than good news in good times.  In these models, investors
are uncertain about the overall state of the market.  Because investors cannot observe the current
state of the market directly, they must infer it from past market performance.  Following a long
period of superior market performance, investors will become highly confident the market is in a
good state.  Under such circumstances, further good news has little impact on investor beliefs.
However, bad news causes market prices to fall for two reasons.  First, bad news causes investors
to infer a lower probability that the market is in the good state.  Second, as uncertainty in the state
of the economy increases, risk-averse investors require a higher expected rate of return to hold
stocks, and the market discount rate rises.2
                                                          
2 It should be noted that the regime shifting models are not directly applicable to the firm-specific empirical results
presented here.  The discount rate effect in the regime shifting models operates through the market risk premium.
Therefore, it will be affected by market wide information.  Individual firm announcements may or may not provide
market wide information.  Furthermore, not all individual firm announcements will carry the same amount of market
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The uncertainty about the state of the economy causes an asymmetry in the response to
good news and bad news.  That is, when investors believe that the economy is in the “bad” state
and good news arrives, this increases the inferred probability that the market is in a good state;
thus, the positive impact on prices is offset by the rising discount rate generated by increased
investor uncertainty.
The regime-switching models discussed above are designed to describe aggregate market
phenomena, not firm-specific responses in different market environments.  In principle, such
models could be extended to permit firm-specific reactions.3  In this paper, we motivate such
research by examining whether the strength of firm-specific responses to new information is
affected by the aggregate level of the market.  Both the regime-shifting models and the behavioral
literature suggest a time series analysis of the reaction of stock prices to both good and bad news in
relation to the level of the market.
In the foregoing discussion, the notion of what defines good times or a high market is not
precisely defined.  Clearly, as a result of both inflation and real economic growth, the level of the
market must be measured relative to some benchmark such as earnings or dividends.  In this paper,
earnings are used to benchmark the level of prices.
Selecting a benchmark does not resolve all the ambiguity related to the level of the market.
When the behavioral and regime shifting models refer to good times does that mean good times in
the absolute sense or relative to recent experience?  More specifically, should the absolute price-
earnings (hereafter P/E) ratio be used to define the level of the market or should the level be
                                                                                                                                                                                               
information.  An announcement by IBM will typically convey more information about general market conditions than
an announcement by a small firm.
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defined by the relation between the current P/E ratio and the ratio observed in the recent past?  In
this paper, the latter, relative, definition of the level of the market is employed.  In particular, the
level of the market is measured by comparing the value-weighted average market P/E ratio at the
end of each firm-announcement month to the monthly average market P/E observed during the
previous 12 months.  In every case, the measure of earnings used is next year’s forecasted earnings.
The “relative” definition of the level of the market is chosen over the “absolute” definition
for several reasons.  To begin, it is more consistent with the behavioral models that are based on the
extrapolation of recent shocks.  More fundamentally, an ARIMA analysis of the price-earnings
ratio during the sample period of our study, 1987 to 1998, reveals that the P/E ratio is closely
approximated by a random walk with positive drift.  See Figure 1, which plots the monthly market
P/E, the sample average P/E, and 12 month moving average (rolling) P/E ratio.4  This fact has two
implications.  First, forming portfolios on the basis of the absolute level of P/E becomes equivalent,
at least in this sample period, to forming them on the basis of time.  The low P/E portfolios would
consist almost exclusively of observations from the late 1980s and early 1990s, while the high P/E
portfolio would include almost exclusively observations from 1997 and 1998.  Second, it implies
that changes in the P/E ratio during the sample period are permanent.  For both of these reasons, it
is more appropriate to measure the level of the market relative to recent experience rather than in
absolute terms.  It is more difficult to assess which measure is more appropriate in the context of
the regime shifting models because the relation between the regimes and the actual behavior of
                                                                                                                                                                                               
3 In correspondence, Veronesi indicates that he is currently developing one such model based on a generalization of his
aggregate market model.
4 After differencing the monthly market P/E series, a test of the residuals to lag twelve does not reject the null
hypothesis of white noise (p-value=0.929).
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stock prices is not spelled out in the theoretical models.  Nonetheless, given the time series
properties of the P/E ratio, it seems more appropriate to define the level of the market in relation to
recent experience.
To explore whether the reaction of stock prices to earnings shocks is affected by the level of
the market, we examine whether the earnings response coefficients for good and bad earnings
shocks change as the relative level of the market changes.  The study is based on a sample of
24,108 announcements of firms’ annual earnings during the period 1988 to 1998.  The level of the
market is defined by the variable, DIFFPE, which is the difference between the market P/E ratio
and the average P/E during the preceding 12 months.  If the research cited previously and the Wall
Street Journal suggestion are correct, stock prices should respond more strongly to negative news
as DIFFPE rises (or as relative market valuations increase).  Similarly, prices should respond more
strongly to good news in bad times, though the effect should be somewhat attenuated if the regime
shifting models are correct.  The findings generally support the hypothesis that stock prices respond
most strongly to bad news in good times. In particular, the stock price response to negative
earnings surprises is monotonically increasing as DIFFPE rises.  The results for good news are
more ambiguous, although findings are weakly consistent with  the notion that the stock price
response to positive earnings surprises is decreasing as DIFFPE rises.  However, consistent with
predictions of regime-shifting models, the difference between bad news and good news response
coefficients is increasing across the DIFFPE portfolios.  Findings based on subsamples of
NASDAQ and NYSE stocks indicate that pricing effects are more pronounced for NASDAQ
stocks.
The regime-shifting models apply to all stocks equally.  If, however, the asymmetric
response to good and bad news is caused in part by “irrational” exuberance in good times, then it is
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possible that the effect is more pronounced for glamour than for value stocks.  To see whether there
is an interaction between our time series analysis and the cross-sectional findings cited above, we
partition our sample into quintiles based on each firm’s ratio of price to earnings in the month
preceding announcement of earnings.  We then examine whether changes in the asymmetry
between good and bad news over time is different for glamour and value stocks.  The findings fail
to indicate any significant difference in the behavior of value and glamour stocks.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the research design and explains our
hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the data and sample.   Section 4 provides the paper’s findings and
section 5 summarizes and concludes the study.
2. Research Design
The discussion in the preceding section suggests examining two hypotheses.  The first is
that the market responds asymmetrically to unexpected good and bad earnings news in good and
bad states.  Bernard, Thomas, and Wahlen (1997), LLSV (1997), and Skinner and Sloan (1998)
document substantial differences in the responses to good and bad earnings shocks.  However,
these studies examine exclusively mean returns for periods subsequent to announcement of
earnings.  In contrast, we focus on the elasticity of stock prices to earnings surprises at
announcement, i.e., earnings response coefficients.  Specifically, we estimate regressions which
allow for a differential response to positive and negative earnings in the overall sample.  In this
regard, we create two indicator variables.  The first, UP, is set equal to one if the shock is positive,
and zero otherwise; the second, DOWN, is equal to one if the shock is negative and zero otherwise.
We then estimate two regressions of the form,
itititit SIZEaUEaaRET ε+++= 210 , (1)
and
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ititititit SIZEbUEDOWNbUEUPbbRET ε++++= 3210 . (2)
In equations (1) and (2), RETit is the excess return on firm i during the earnings
announcement period as defined below and UEit is the unexpected earnings for firm i at time t
computed using the I/B/E/S data to measure expectations.  In equation (2), UEUP (UEDOWN) is
the product of unexpected earnings, UE, and the indicator variable, UP (DOWN); this permits the
slope on UE to be different conditional on the sign of the earnings surprise.  SIZE is the natural log
of equity market value in the period prior to the firm’s earnings announcement (see footnote 7).
The intercept in each equation is the mean excess return in the announcement period for firms with
UE=0.  The size proxy is included to control for risk differences not already reflected in excess
return (Fama and French, 1991) and for potential scale differences (Barth and Kallapur, 1996).  If
the market response to good and bad earnings innovations is asymmetric then equation (2) should
have significantly more explanatory power than equation (1) and the hypothesis that b1 = b2 should
be rejected.
The second, and more innovative, hypothesis is that the degree of asymmetry depends on
the level of the market.  To investigate this hypothesis we use the ratio of price to forecasted future
earnings to measure the relative level of the market.  More specifically, using DIFFPE, the sample
of earnings announcements is divided into quintiles.  The first quintile contains the earnings
announcements that occurred when DIFFPE is the lowest.  The other quintiles contain earnings
announcements that occurred when DIFFPE is progressively larger.  If the announcement
asymmetry depends on the level of the market then the difference between b1 and b2 should change
as equation (2) is estimated for quintiles defined by progressively greater levels of DIFFPE.
Finally, it is possible that the time series hypotheses examined here interact with the cross-
sectional value/glamour effects documented in the literature reviewed in the previous section.
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More specifically, the asymmetry between the response to good and bad news may vary both over
time and across stocks with the relative sensitivity to bad news being more pronounced for glamour
stocks in good times and less pronounced for value stocks in bad times.  To test for this interaction,
we sort individual companies into quintiles based on each firm’s P/E ratio in the month preceding
its earnings announcement, where the ratio is based on next year’s forecasted earnings.  The
companies in the lowest quintile are the “value” stocks and the companies in the highest quintile
are the “glamour” stocks.  Using these definitions we test whether the asymmetry varies cross-
sectionally as well as over time.
3. Data
Our sample period extends from 1988 through 1998.  Consensus earnings forecasts, realized
earnings and earnings report dates are collected from I/B/E/S.  For each earnings announcement,
we define an event window which extends from day –20 through 0 relative to the earnings report
date.  This window is divided into a pre-announcement period, extending from day –20 through day
–6, and an announcement period, extending from day –5 through day 0.  These earnings data are
subsequently matched with price, shares and returns data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP).  For each firm and each report date, raw returns are summed across the event
window; excess returns are calculated as the sum of the firm’s raw returns during the event window
less the sum of the CRSP value-weighted market return over the same period.5  A firm must have a
price available on the earnings report date to be included in the sample.  To analyze the price
                                                          
5 As a specification check, we also examine excess compounded returns, which minimize bid-ask bias; these excess
returns are calculated as the compounded raw return in the announcement (pre-announcement) period, less the
compounded market return over the same interval.  As discussed in section 4.3 below, findings are essentially identical
to those reported.
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impact of an earnings shock in the announcement period, unexpected earnings, UE, (or earnings
shocks) are calculated as:
UE = (Actual earnings – consensus forecast earnings)/Price(−6) (3)
where Price(−6) is the share price six days before the earnings announcement (or one day prior to
the announcement window).6
To reduce the impact of outliers, if the earnings shock is greater than (less than) 0.5 (−0.5),
then the value of the earnings shock is winsorized to 0.5 (−0.5).  To minimize the effect of market
frictions (see, e.g., Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1993)), observations with Price(−6) (Price (–20)) in
the announcement (pre-announcement) window of less than $5.00 are deleted.  To remove the
impact of stock splits or stock dividends in the event window, we delete observations where the
number of shares outstanding 20 days prior to the earnings announcement differs from shares
outstanding on the announcement date.  Consistent with prior research showing earnings response
coefficients are essentially zero for firms reporting negative earnings (e.g., Hayn (1995) and Lipe,
Bryant, and Widener (1998)), observations where firms report negative earnings are deleted.
Finally, observations for which the ratio of actual earnings to market capitalization on day zero
exceeds one are also deleted.
To categorize whether the earnings announcement occurred in a ‘high’ or ‘low’ valuation
state, a monthly time-series of market price/earnings ratios are estimated using the I/B/E/S data.  To
calculate the market P/E for a particular month t, we first collect the consensus earnings forecast for
the next fiscal year made in month t for each firm, as well as the observed price in month t for that
                                                          
6 As an additional specification check, we examine the period extending from day –20 to day –6 to test for pre-
announcement leakage, particularly for bad news (Skinner and Sloan, 1998).  For these specifications, earnings shocks
are standardized by the price on day –20.
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firm.  We construct a value-weighted average of the earnings-to-price ratio across firms, then take
the reciprocal of this number as the market price-earnings ratio.  Thus, we calculate:
P/E(mkt)t = 1/[ ∑i={1,Nt}wit(Et[EPSiτ]/Pit)], (4)
where wit is the value of firm i relative to the total market value of firms available in the sample for
month t, Pit is the share price of firm i in month t, and Et(EPSiτ) is the consensus analysts’ forecast
in month t for annual earnings reported in month τ.  Firms are deleted from the average if they do
not have price, forecasted earnings or shares outstanding numbers available; only earnings forecasts
less than one year old are considered when constructing this average (that is, τ must be no more
than 12 months distant from t.).
After the time-series of market price/earnings ratios is constructed, DIFFPE, the difference
between each month’s market price/earnings ratio and the average of the market’s monthly
price/earnings ratio over the previous 12 months’ period is calculated.  Earnings announcements
are then grouped into one of five portfolios based on the value of this difference as of the
announcement month.  The mean  DIFFPE for the five portfolios are –1.45, 0.01, 0.62, 1.09 and
1.99.  Note that although the sample period of earnings announcements extends from 1988 through
1998, because DIFFPE is based on the difference between the announcement month’s market P/E
and the average market P/E over the prior 12 months, the P/E(mkt)t series extends back an
additional year to 1987.
4. Findings
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1, panel A, presents sample descriptive statistics for earnings surprises, UEit, and
earnings response coefficients and adjusted R2 values from a regression of excess returns, RETit,
and UEit , in equation (1).  Consistent with prior research indicating analysts are optimistically
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biased (O’Brien, 1988, Kang et al., 1994), mean UE is negative.  However, when we examine
average earnings shocks by year, we find that the largest negative shocks occur, on average, in the
early part of our sample period.  For example, three out of the seven years between 1992 and 1998
have positive average shocks, with the 1997 mean UE significantly positive and averaging 0.05%
of the stock price.  The sample average earnings response coefficient of 0.20 is significant and also
is comparable to that found in prior research (Brown et al, 1987).7  Finally, mean excess return,
RET, is approximately zero, which is expected given that mean UE is economically small.
Table 1, panel B, presents findings analogous to those in panel A, but broken down by sign
of earnings surprise.  Mean positive unexpected earnings, UEUP, and negative unexpected
earnings, UEDOWN, are of similar magnitude, 0.0067 and –0.0098.  Untabulated findings indicate
no major trends in their magnitude differences, although the number of UEUP (UEDOWN) is
generally rising (declining) during the sample period.  The largest difference is in 1989, when mean
UEDOWN is –0.007 and mean UEUP is 0.005.
The earnings response coefficients corresponding to positive and negative earnings shocks,
b1 and b2 from equation (2), are 0.17 and 0.24, and they are marginally significantly different (p-
value=0.09), indicating a weak asymmetry in the market’s response to good and bad news.
Consistent with this finding, the adjusted R2 of 0.56 percent, is identical to the value associated
with equation (1) in which b1 and b2 are constrained to be equal.  This finding is only weakly
consistent with Skinner and Sloan (1998) who find an asymmetry in mean security returns for
positive and negative earnings surprises, unconditional on the magnitude of the earnings surprise.
Finally, mean excess return, RET, is 0.0154, 0.0058, and –0.0059 for positive, zero, and negative
                                                          
7 Throughout the paper, we use a five percent criterion for assessing statistical significance.
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unexpected earnings subsamples, indicating that the mean return difference for negative and zero
UE firms, 1.17%, is larger than that for the positive and zero UE firms, 0.96%.
Before turning to findings from estimations of equations (1) and (2) for the separate market
P/E portfolios, it is useful to extend the earlier analysis on the time series characteristics of the
market during our sample period.  Table 2 provides a description of the level of the market over
time as measured by our forward-looking weighted average price-earnings multiple.  Panel A
presents statistics for market PE as well as DIFFPE, the difference between market prevailing
during firm-announcement months and the average market PE during the prior 12 months.  Mean
annual PE is just the average for the twelve calendar months.  Although mean PE is generally rising
during the 1990’s, it clearly is not monotonic, falling from an average of 17.80 in 1994 to 15.97 in
1995.  Mean market PE values rise to their highest levels in 1997 and 1998, reflecting the booming
stock prices during this period.
Mean annual DIFFPE is computed as the mean DIFFPE for the sample firm-
announcements during a given year, not the simple monthly mean difference in market PE and
average market PE for the prior 12 months.  In contrast to PE, mean DIFFPE exhibits no apparent
secular trend.  This is because DIFFPE is a relative measure reflecting the difference between the
level of the market when earnings are announced and the recent (12 month) historical level of the
market.  However, as with PE, the maximum mean annual DIFFPE also appears in 1998, when the
market is at historically high levels.
The annual standard deviation in DIFFPE ranges from 0.47 in 1996 to 1.38 in 1991,
indicating there is within-year variation in DIFFPE.  Stated another way, firm-announcements
from particular years will not necessarily all be placed within one specific DIFFPE group, of which
there are five.  Table 2, panel B, lists the number of firms within each DIFFPE portfolio for each
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sample year.  High DIFFPE firm-announcements (DIFFPE = 4 and 5) are bunched
disproportionately in 1998, when the market is at its historically high level.  However, in the prior
year, 1997, when the market PE is second only to 1998, there are nearly as many middle range
DIFFPE firm-announcements as there are high ones.  With the exception of the two lowest
DIFFPE categories in 1993 and the highest DIFFPE categories in 1988, firm-announcements span
the DIFFPE categories in each sample year.
Table 3, panel A, presents unexpected earnings statistics for the five DIFFPE portfolios for
the full sample.  Panel B presents analogous statistics but broken down by the sign of unexpected
earnings.  Panel A reveals a monotonic increase in earnings shocks across the five portfolios,
ranging from a mean of –0.0013 in DIFFPE portfolio 1 to 0.0002 for portfolio 5.  Panel B reveals
no apparent pattern in the magnitude of positive and negative shocks across the five portfolios
4.2 Regression results for DIFFPE portfolios
We now turn to the primary hypothesis of our study, that the difference between earnings
response coefficients, b1 and b2 in equation (2), should increase with the valuation level of the
market.  Table 4, panels A and B, presents the regression summary statistics corresponding to
equations (1) and (2) for each of the DIFFPE portfolios.8  The findings for equation (1) in panel A,
in which b1 and b2 are constrained to be equal, indicate no apparent trend in the UE response
coefficients, a1.  The highest a1 estimates obtain for middle and highest DIFFPE portfolios.  All
response coefficients are significantly positive.
                                                          
8 The regression sample of 24,077, which is 31 less than the sample of firm-announcements used in tables 1 through 3,
results from the additional data requirement of available market value data to compute the size variable, log(mve).  The
market value information is calculated at day –6; if this value is missing, we use the day –7 value, then day –8 and so
on.  If the value is still missing at day –10, we use the value at day –1.
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The evidence in table 4, panel B, reveals a striking difference in the pattern of response
coefficients for positive and negative earnings surprises.  For ease of comparison, the UEUP and
UEDOWN coefficients across the five DIFFPE portfolios are plotted in figure 2, and their
differences are plotted in figure 3.  Looking first at the negative earnings surprises, the coefficients
on UEDOWN, b2, are all significantly positive.  More importantly, the response coefficients
increase monotonically across the five DIFFPE groupings.  This finding suggests that the market
reacts more strongly to bad news as market levels rise and is consistent with predictions of both the
regime shifting models and behavioral models.
In contrast to the negative earnings surprises, the UEUP response coefficients, b1, exhibit
no apparent trend.  As depicted in figure 2, the pattern of b1 values exhibits a W-shape with a slight
overall decline from the high of 0.25 for the lowest DIFFPE portfolio to a value of 0.20 for the
highest DIFFPE portfolio.  Also in contrast to the negative earnings shocks, not all of the positive
earnings surprise response coefficients are significant.  With the exception of the DIFFPE=3
portfolio, the market appears to find positive earnings surprises relatively uninformative when
market levels are consistent with expectations.  To the extent there is a slight downward trend in
positive earnings response coefficients, this is consistent with predictions of the regime-shifting
models which posit good news is more informative in down markets than up markets.
The key prediction of extended regime-shifting models relates to the expected pattern in the
difference in market responses to bad news and good news.  In up markets (i.e., when DIFFPE=5),
bad news conveys both negative future cash flow implications as well as an increase in uncertainty
and an increase in the discount rate; good news conveys little information regarding either cash
flow or uncertainty.  In down markets (i.e., when DIFFPE=1), good news conveys positive future
cash flow implications.  However, the positive reaction is dampened by an increase in uncertainty
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and the discount rate.  Bad news conveys little information regarding either cash flow or
uncertainty.  Thus, the difference between bad news and good news response coefficients in up
markets should exceed the difference between the good news and bad news response coefficients in
down markets.  Alternatively stated, the difference between bad news and good news response
coefficients should be increasing across the DIFFPE portfolios.  The plot of this difference,
depicted in figure 3, indicates our findings generally are consistent with the regime-shifting model
prediction. The difference in UEDOWN and UEUP coefficients rises from –0.089 in the
DIFFPE=1 portfolio, to 0.161 in the DIFFPE=5 portfolio.  A regression of the coefficient
differences on DIFFPE indicates the slope is significantly positive (p-value=0.05 under a one-sided
alternative).  With the exception of the drop from DIFFPE=4 to DIFFPE=5, the difference
increases across all portfolios.
The results are also consistent with the broad predictions of the behavioral models.
Presumably the greater the relative increase in stock prices, the more pronounced are investors’
extrapolations and the greater the impact of unexpected bad news.  Unlike, the regime shifting
models however, the behavioral models predict a reverse, but symmetric impact, when stock prices
fall.  This prediction is not consistent with the findings.
4.3.1 Value-Glamour
One strand of the value/glamour literature reviewed in the first section suggests that greater
average returns on value as compared to glamour stocks returns is attributable to the tendency of
analysts and/or investors to extrapolate irrationally past corporate performance.  As a result,
glamour stocks with historically high growth rates tend to become overpriced.  When bad news
finally reveals to investors the error of their ways, the prices of glamour stocks fall sharply.
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If the irrational extrapolation theory is correct, then it should be the case that as the market
rises the asymmetry in the response to good and bad news becomes relatively more pronounced for
glamour stocks.  To assess whether this is the case, we examine how the asymmetrical response to
good and bad news varies across stocks as well as over time.  Specifically, we sort individual
companies into quintiles based on their P/E ratios in the month preceding each firm announcement,
where earnings is based on next year’s forecasted earnings.  The companies in the lowest quintile
are the “value” stocks and the companies in the highest quintile are the “glamour” stocks.9  We
then reestimate equations (1) and (2) for each of the five DIFFPE groupings, permitting the
coefficients of UEUP and UEDOWN to vary for value stocks (quintile 1) and glamour stocks
(quintile 5) and average stocks (quintiles 2 through 4).
The results, which are not reported, fail to reveal any significant distinction between the
behavior of value and glamour stocks.  That is, the findings reported in table 4, panel B and
depicted in figures 2 and 3 hold approximately equally for value and glamour stocks.
In light of the findings of Bernard, Thomas, and Wahlen (1997), LLSV (1997), and Skinner
and Sloan (1998), our results are somewhat surprising.  However, the studies are not directly
comparable.  Not only are the sample periods different, but we examine the response coefficients to
unexpected good and bad news whereas the previous studies examined mean returns for periods
following earnings announcements.
4.3.2 NASDAQ vs. NYSE
Although size is included as a control for risk in equations (1) and (2), it is possible that
response effects could be more pronounced for NASDAQ than NYSE firms because of risk
                                                          
9 As LLSV (1997) report, the impact of the glamour/value distinction is relatively invariant to variables used to define
it be they E/P, Book/Market, or some similar measure.
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differences for which we have not controlled.  To explore this possibility, we re-estimate equations
(1) and (2) separately for NASDAQ and NYSE firms.
Table 5, panels A and B, presents regression summary statistics for equations (1) and (2) for
NASDAQ firms; table 6, panels A and B, presents regression summary statistics for equations (1)
and (2) for NYSE firms.  Inspection of findings in both tables indicate that the findings for the
overall sample appear to generalize to both sets of firms.  However, the pattern of increases in bad
news response coefficients and decreases in good news response coefficients across the DIFFPE
portfolios is markedly more pronounced for  NASDAQ firms than NYSE firms. For example,
whereas the UEDOWN coefficients increase only 0.140 between the DIFFPE=1 and DIFFPE=5
portfolios for NYSE firms, for NASDAQ firms the UEDOWN coefficients increase 0.595 between
the same two portfolios.  In fact, findings from separate regressions of UEUP and UEDOWN
coefficients on DIFFPE cannot reject the null hypothesis of a slope of zero for NYSE firms.  In
contrast, analogous regressions for NASDAQ firms indicates the UEDOWN coefficients are
marginally increasing across the DIFFPE portfolios (p-value = 0.075 under a one-sided
alternative).  More importantly, whereas for NASDAQ firms the difference between UPDOWN and
UEUP coefficients exhibits a significantly increasing slope in a manner consistent with figure 3 (p-
value=0.007 under a one-sided alternative), the difference in coefficients for NYSE firms exhibits
no pattern.  These findings suggest that the pricing effects are far more pronounced for NASDAQ
firms than NYSE firms.  However, during our sample, including 1997 and 1998, the aggregate
stock returns of NASDAQ and NYSE stocks are not fundamentally different.  For example, in the
period 1997 through 1998, the difference in returns was only approximately 4% (69% vs. 65%).
Thus, the pricing difference for the two samples appears not to be a result of differences in stock
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price runups..  Developing a more complete understanding for the pricing differences is a challenge
for future research.
4.3.3 Other specification checks
Skinner and Sloan (1998) find evidence of significant pre-announcement effects in their
sample of earnings announcements.  To test whether such effects are present in our sample, we
examine the period extending from day –20 to day –6.  Consistent with Skinner and Sloan (1998),
untabulated findings provide evidence of pre-announcement market responses, particularly for
negative earnings shocks.  However, adding the preannoucement earnings response coefficients to
those from the announcement period does not alter the tenor of our reported findings.
Finally, as an additional specification check, we reestimated equations (1) and (2) for each
of the DIFFPE portfolios compounding returns rather than cumulating them (Bernard and Thomas,
1989; and Conrad and Kaul, 1993).  Not surprisingly given the relatively short window we examine
(6 days in the announcement period and 15 days in the pre-announcement period), the results are
virtually identical to those reported in table 4.
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Two separate strands of literature imply that as the level of the market rises, stock prices
will become relatively more sensitive to bad news than good news.  The first, based on research in
behavioral psychology, suggests that investors inappropriately extrapolate past performance. As a
result, bad news has a particularly telling impact after a period of good news because it has the
effect of correcting overoptimistic projections.  The second, based on extended regime shifting
models, also predicts that the market will respond more strongly to bad news than good news when
stock prices are high.
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To test the hypothesis that stock prices respond more strongly to bad news than good news
when stock prices are high, we examine the reaction of stock prices to of 24,108 announcements of
firms’ annual earnings during the period 1988-98.  Firm-announcements are placed into one of five
portfolios based on a relative market level of the market measure, the difference between the
current market P/E ratio and the average P/E during the preceding 12 months.  We then examine
the reaction of stock prices to both positive and negative earnings surprises for each portfolio
separately.
The findings generally support the hypothesis that stock prices respond most strongly to bad
news in good times.  In particular, the stock price response to negative earnings surprises is
monotonically increasing as the market level rises.  The results for good news, while less strong,
are consistent with  the notion that the stock price response to positive earnings surprises is
decreasing as the market level rises.  However, consistent with predictions of regime-shifting
models, the difference between bad news and good news response coefficients is increasing as the
market level rises.  Findings based on subsamples of NASDAQ and NYSE stocks indicate that
pricing effects are more pronounced for NASDAQ stocks.  Explaining this difference between the
reaction of NASDAQ and NYSE firms is a challenge for future research.
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 TABLE 1
Unexpected earnings summary statistics and regression statistics for overall sample.
Sample period is annual earnings for 1990-1998.
PANEL A:  FULL SAMPLE
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV     N
UE -0.00058 0.023495 24,108
RET  0.0059007 0.0706 24,108
RET = a0  +  a1 UE  +  a2  SIZE  +  e
a0         0.025
            (7.04)
a1  0.201
          (10.36)
a2           −0.002
           (-5.41)
     Adj.R2           0.0056
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TABLE 1
PANEL B:  SAMPLE PARTITIONED BY SIGN OF UNEXPECTED EARNINGS
UE > 0
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV N
UE 0.0067 0.0230 12,454
RET 0.0154 0.0680 12,454
UE = 0
RET 0.0058 0.0710   1,687
UE < 0
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV N
UE −0.0098  0.0232  9,967
RET −0.0059 0.0720  9,967
RET  =  b0  +  b1  UEUP  +  b2  UEDOWN  +  b3 SIZE   +  E
b0  0.026
           (7.23)
b1  0.169
           (6.17)
b2  0.238
           (8.03)
b3           −0.002
          (-5.62)
     Adj. R2 0.0056
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TABLE 2
PANEL A: market price-to-forecasted earnings, PE, and DIFFPE, summary statistics.
Market PE statistics are based on end-of-month values.  DIFFPE statistics are
computed using DIFFPEs prevailing during each firm-announcement month.
Market  PE
Mean Std Dev Max Min N
1988 11.599 0.464 12.740 10.913 1021
1989 11.961 0.767 14.037 11.295 1464
1990 12.681 0.606 13.700 11.327 1550
1991 13.809 1.744 17.044 11.527 1594
1992 16.021 0.864 17.883 14.631 1807
1993 16.992 0.889 18.950 16.142 2018
1994 17.805 0.956 19.595 16.097 2473
1995 15.967 0.618 17.695 15.332 2895
1996 16.560 0.499 18.808 16.592 2960
1997 19.193 1.115 21.614 17.437 3163
1998 21.762 0.976 24.342 20.585 3163
All years
Mean 16.842
Std dev   3.064
Max              24.342
Min              10.913
DIFFPE
Mean          Std Dev Max  Min N
1988 -2.450 0.966 -0.129 -3.333 1021
1989  0.376 0.624                1.890               -0.205 1464
1990  0.076 0.700  1.223 -1.483 1550
1991  1.075 1.373  3.315 -1.058 1594
1992  0.483 1.297  3.149 -1.697 1807
1993  0.991 0.524  1.776  0.420 2018
1994  0.105 1.058  2.123 -1.347 2473
1995 -0.802 0.819  1.431 -1.482 2895
1996  0.843 0.466  1.417 -0.551 2960
1997  1.099 0.754  2.937 -0.519 3163





Min            −3.333
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TABLE 2
Panel B:  Distribution of Firm-announcements by Year and DIFFPE Portfolio
DIFFPE  =   1  2  3 4         5
1988 919 102  0 0          0
1989     0 805             247            363        49
1990 125            1,014             104            307                    0
1991 217     0              836              93      448
1992 318 411              836  0      242
1993     0     0              989            307      722
1994 870            1,203                 0                0      400
1995             2,163               247             320             86       79
1996    93               546             177         2,144         0
1997      0               511           1,102            400  1,150
1998                156     0             165         1,111  1,731
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TABLE 3
PANEL A:    Unexpected Earnings Overall Sample
Unexpected Earnings Sample Summary Statistics by DIFFPE Portfolio
Mean Std Dev Min Max  N
DIFFPE  =  1 −0.0013 0.0224 −0.5 0.4 4,861
           2 −0.0010 0.0265 −0.5 0.5 4,839
          3 −0.0009 0.0245 −0.5 0.5 4,776
           4               0.0001               0.0203   0.173 0.5 4,811
           5   0.0002 0.0233 −0.5 0.5 4,821
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TABLE 3
PANEL B:  Sample Partitioned by Sign of Unexpected Earnings
Unexpected Earnings Sample Summary Statistics by DIFFPE Portfolio
UE > 0
                  Mean          Std Dev              Min           Max            N
DIFFPE  =   1     0.0062          0.0185                   0.0000                      0.4                    2,480
       2   0.0084          0.0256           0.0000 0.5           2,352
               3   0.0069          0.0222           0.0000 0.5                2,408
               4   0.0062          0.0223           0.0000 0.5           2,575
               5   0.0061          0.0242           0.0000 0.5               2,639
UE<0
Mean Std Dev   Min    Max    N
     DIFFPE =       1   -0.0105      0.0248              −0.5 −0.0000   2,052
2   -0.0112    0.0253     −0.5  −0.0000 2,204
3   -0.0103      0.0260 −0.5 −0.0000 2,008
4   -0.0083    0.0160 −0.173 −0.0000 1,878
5   -0.0083      0.0215 −0.5  −0.0000 1,825
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Table 4
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample
period covers annual earnings for 1990-1998.  Full sample findings.
PANEL A: itititit SIZEaUEaaRET ε+++= 210
DIFFPE UE SIZE                  Adj.R2               NOBS
1 0.198 -0.00 0.58 4,858
                           (4.57)     (−3.28)
2 0.150 0.00 0.30 4,830
                           (4.02)  (0.20)
3 0.246 −0.00 0.87 4,769
                           (5.58) (−3.69)
4                             0.141 −0.00 0.21 4,804
                           (2.86) (−2.00)
5                            0.255 −0.00 0.97 4,816
                              (5.59) (−4.17)
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Table 4 (continued)
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample
period covers annual earnings for 1990-1998.  Full sample findings.
PANEL B: ititititit SIZEbUEDOWNbUEUPbbRET ε++++= 3210
DIFFPE UEUP UEDOWN SIZE      Adj.R2             NOBS
         1 0.251                      0.162               −0.00                    0.58              4,857
                           (3.50) (2.81)               (−3.09)
2 0.102 0.201     −0.00 0.31             4,830
                           (1.88) (3.61)     (−0.01)
3 0.264 0.231 −0.00 0.85             4,769
                           (3.91) (3.73) (−3.58)
4 0.049 0.346 00.00 0.33             4,804
                              (0.80) (3.68)  (−2.51)
5 0.201 0.362 −0.00 1.00             4,816
                           (3.51) (4.41) (−4.38)
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Table 5
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample period
covers annual earnings for 1990−1998.  Findings for NASDAQ FIRMS.
PANEL A: itititit SIZEaUEaaRET ε+++= 210
DIFFPE UE SIZE                  Adj.R2               NOBS
1 0.323 −0.00 0.80 2,378
                           (4.36)     (−1.67)
2 0.132 0.00 0.30 2,438
                           (2.31)  (1.92)
3 0.417 −0.00 1.20 2,362
                           (5.20) (−2.04)
4 0.132 0.00 0.05 2,328
                           (1.76) (0.27)
5 0.360 −0.00 0.66 2,393
                    (4.10)                   (−1.07)
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Table 5
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample period
covers annual earnings for 1990−1998.  Findings for NASDAQ FIRMS.
PANEL B: ititititit SIZEbUEDOWNbUEUPbbRET ε++++= 3210
DIFFPE UEUP UEDOWN SIZE      Adj.R2             NOBS
         1  0.439                     0.266                 −0.00                   0.80              2,378
                           (3.20)                     (2.85)                (−1.48)
2 0.055 0.213 0.00 0.33 2,438
                           (0.67) (2.51)     (1.70)
3 0.275 0.616 −0.00 1.31 2,362
                           (2.52) (4.70) (−2.41)
4 0.064 0.321 −0.00 0.09 2,328
                           (0.71) (2.06)  (−0.03)
5 0.210 0.861 −0.00 0.95 2,393
                           (2.05) (4.35) (−1.69)
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Table 6
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample period
covers annual earnings for 1990−1998.  Findings for NYSE FIRMS.
PANEL A: itititit SIZEaUEaaRET ε+++= 210
DIFFPE UE SIZE                  Adj.R2               NOBS
1 0.100 −0.00 0.30 2,428
                           (2.01)      (−2.37)
2 0.167 −0.00 0.50 2,446
                           (3.75)  (−0.61)
3 0.131 −0.00 0.52 2,408
                           (2.79) (−2.68)
4 0.154 −0.00 0.28 2,478
                           (2.48) (−1.71)
5 0.192 −0.00 1.17 2,426
                 (4.21)                      (−3.62)
- 36 -
Table 6
Average coefficients, associated t-statistics and adjusted R2s return regressions for annual earnings announcements.  Sample period
covers annual earnings for 1990−1998.  Findings for NYSE FIRMS.
PANEL B: ititititit SIZEbUEDOWNbUEUPbbRET ε++++= 3210
DIFFPE UEUP UEDOWN SIZE      Adj.R2             NOBS
         1 0.153                     0.055                 −0.00                   0.29               2,428
                           (2.00)                     (0.78)                (−2.14)
2 0.177 0.157 −0.00 0.46 2,446
                           (2.68) (2.36)     (−0.55)
3 0.237 0.065 −0.00 0.59 2,408
                           (3.00) (1.07) (−2.35)
4 0.037 0.347 0.00 0.44 2,478
                           (0.45) (3.22)  (−2.22)
5 0190 0.195 −0.00 1.13 2,426
                  (3.15)                       (2.60)                  (−3.55)
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